A bliger looks like a single animal from afar but, on closer inspection, turns out to be several small animals traveling in formation so as to give the appearance of a large predator. ‘The bliger’ (like ‘TomKat’) is syntactically singular but semantically plural. The bliger isn’t one single thing, it’s several things.
Suppose that at t1, I see a bliger from afar but don’t realize it’s not a single thing. At t2, I learn the truth about bligers. At t3, I again spot one from afar. It seems quite natural to say that things are exactly the way they look to be at t3, even though there is another sense in which it still looks to me as though there is a single animal out there. (Compare: It may sound to me as though a gun has been fired when in fact it was a car backfiring, yet I did not mishear anything.) If so, then it cannot be part of the phenomenal content of my experience at t3 that there is something (i.e., some one thing) that has so and so qualities, for in that case my experience would be nonveridical even at the most fundamental level.
Objection 1: “After learning the truth about bligers, the content of the experience changes. At t1, the content is that there is a thing there with such and such qualities, but at t3 the content is that there are some things there with such and such qualities.” Yet it is quite plausible that, at least at some level, things look the same to me now as they did before I learned the truth about bligers. This would require that the content be plurally existential at both times.
Objection 2: “The several small animals *do* compose something; composition is unrestricted.” But the thesis that composition is unrestricted is open to decisive counterexamples. For instance, bligers. I can give other counterexamples too, if you want.
Objection 3: “You’ve shown only that phenomenal content of the bliger experience does not involve *singularly* existential quantification. But maybe what this shows is that the phenomenal content is plurally existential: there are some things that (collectively) have so and so qualities.” Maybe that’s right. But my bliger experience is not relevantly different from an ordinary experience of a panther from after. So, by parity, the phenomenal content of an experience of a panther is not (singularly) existential. By parity, the phenomenal content of an experience of a panther up close is not (singularly) existential. By parity, none of my experiences are (singularly) existential.