"kind of know how"

[What follows is a quick sketch of some thoughts I've had concerning knowledge how and "incompleteness" modifiers, based on a quick look at Utpal Lahiri's book Questions and Answers in Embedded Questions. Nevertheless, I've put them down because I feel bad that Dan Korman has been carrying the load lately; well, and also it would be great to get some feedback on this line of reasoning.]

It is pretty commonplace to modify knowledge how attributions with what I will call "incompleteness" modifiers, because they in some sense indicate an incomplete knowledge state. Some examples:

1. x kinda knows how to get back to the car.
2. x sorta knows how to fix the car.
3. x partly knows how to navigate the scene.

My sense is that sentences like (1) and (2) entail the denial of the unqualified knowledge attribution. So (1), for instance, entails that x does not know how to get back to the car. What seems to be going on with incompleteness modifiers is that they function to "walk back" the bald assertion that the subjection is in a certain state (e.g., of knowing how to get back to the car) and is instead in a state which is similar to that state but which falls short of it in some way.

Now, at first this might seem like a point in favor of a neo-Rylean theory of know-how. After all, abilities (as Ryle noted) come in degrees. By contrast, propositional knowledge doesn't appear to be gradable. But on reflection, the case isn't so clear. Here is the worry. Suppose that we accept that knowledge how to attributions attribute stable abilities. Then the most natural way to think about the effect of the incompleteness modifier is to take the truth conditions of the resulting sentence to be such that x kinda knows how to get back to the car iff x can come close to getting back to the car, but can't quite do it. But that doesn't seem right. If x is missing certain crucial bits of information, she might still kinda know how to get back, but could fail to even come close to actually getting back were she to try. Similarly for fixing the car: kinda knowing how to fix the car doesn't mean that if you were to try, you would in fact come close because the place at which you fail might lead you far astray.

If that is right, then the neo-Rylean will need to do some work to explain what "coming close to, but not reaching" means. So one question is how might they try to spell this out?

I want to contrast this proposal, with John's and my intelletualist proposal. On our view, knowing how to fix a car entails having a correct and complete conception of a way of fixing the the car. So the natural proposal from our perspective (I think) is to say that knowledge how to attributions containing incompleteness modifiers are true iff the subject has a correct and largely, but not fully, complete conception of a way of fixing the car. This gets the relationship with ability right. If certain x's conception of a way of fixing the car is lacking on crucial points, then were x to act on that conception she might misfire badly. Nevertheless, she qualifies as kinda knowing how to fix the car because her conception is largely complete. [Actually, on reflection, I think we'd be willing to say of someone who had a complete and largely, but not wholly, correct conception of a way of fixing a car that she kinda knows how to fix it. Which is all to the good.]

At any rate, I doubt this settles the issue one way or the other, but I definitely think it is an interesting angle to the debate. Thoughts?

Comments

[Jonathan]

I'm not inclined to agree with you that sentences like (1) and (2) entail the falsehood of unqualified knowledge-how. (They may well implicate such falsehood, in familiar Gricean ways.)

What do you think about other similar cases? Does someone's being kinda smart entail that he is not smart?

[Aidan McGlynn]

My first reaction is the same as Jonathan's - I don't get the entailment to the falsity of the know-how attribution. I instinctively interpret 'sorta' and 'kinda' as 'somewhat', and I don't hear 'X is somewhat smart' as entailing 'X is not smart': likewise for the (kinda clumsy) analogous constructions involving know-how.

[Marc Moffett]

Thanks guys. Perhaps you are right, but let me try to push my case a little further.

I considered the implicature point, but it didn't seem to me to pass the cancelability test. Thus:

1. * Bo kinda knows how to fix the car; in fact, he knows how.

I suspect that the modifiers are functioning differently in the two contexts. After all, "x is kinda smart" seems to me to entail "x is smart".

2. * Bo is kinda smart; but, in fact, he isn't smart.

By contrast, even if we put the entailment to one side for a moment, it seems clear to me that "x kinda knows how to fix the car" is at least consistent with "x does not know how to fix the car."

Why the difference? Well, it seems to me that this is because smarts, while coming in degrees, don't admit of completeness or incompleteness evaluations. An incompleteness modifier, consequently would be inappropriate in its application to "smart". This is born out by the less controversial qua incompleteness modifier "partly":

3. * Bo is partly smart.

So I submit, tentatively, that "kinda" and "sorta" are ambiguous (or polysemous) between an incompleteness reading and a comparative reading. Where the incompleteness reading is in play, there is no implicit or explicit comparison to others or operative standards.

Following this line of thought out, what do you guys think of the following?

4. Bo kinda/sorta knows the rules.

Do you agree that (4) entails that Bo does not know the rules? Or what about:

5. Bo kinda/sorta knows the way (to Terabithia).

[Actually, let me digress for a moment on (5) because it seems to me that it bears on some of the know how discussion. Each of the following claims seem to me true: If Bo only kinda knows the way to Terabithia, then he doesn't know how to get to Terabithia (he only kinda knows). However, it is possible that Bo's partial knowledge of the way might be sufficient for reliably getting him to Terabithia because the gaps in his knowledge can be "filled in" in situ as it were. (I sometimes have this experience hiking out of the mountains.) If so, then Bo's partial knowledge state underwrites a reliable ability to get to Terabithia even though Bo doesn't know how to get to Terabithia. Conclusion: having a reliable ability to F doesn't imply knowing how to F. This is something John and I have already argued for on the basis of a misunderstanding of a way; this is a similar case but based on partial understanding of a way. End digression.]

To my ear, (4) and (5) are clear cases for the incompleteness reading and once we have it in mind as the intended reading in my original cases, I stand by the entailment claim.

[Marc Moffett]

So, on a bit more reflection, I think that I want to concede that the entailment doesn't hold, or at least bracket the claim. I take it that "kinda" and "sorta" are adverbs of quantification. So, for instance, x kinda knows the rules iff x knows most of the rules (undoubtedly simplifying). And that, in turn, is consistent with x's knowing all the rules (and so knowing the rules).

But the entailment is not essential to my point. I think all that matters is that there are cases where it is true to say that x sorta knows how to F, but doesn't know how to F. This is seemingly consistent with a neo-Rylean theory of know-how since surely there are cases where one can sorta F but can't actually F. Still, I think in these cases we wouldn't want to say that x can sorta F unless x could do something which approximated F-ing. (Can you sorta do a handstand, if you can't even push up and balance on your hands for a moment?) On the other hand, it seems to me that there are cases where x sorta knows how to F, but can't do anything which approximates F-ing. For instance, I might sort of know how to get back to the car, but if I acted on this I might just lead us very far astray. The result might not in any way approximate getting back to the car!

So what I need for the argument is not that "sorta knowing how to F" entails "not knowing how to F" but rather that "sorta knowing how to F" does NOT entail "knowing how to F".

[John Cocktosen]

Two points:

(1) I wouldn't give up the entailment Marc, though I think that Jonathan and Aidan have a point. I think that they may be concerned with the scope of the incompleteness operator in the proposition, "x sorta knows how to fix the car." (From your first response to their comments I'm beginning to question whether you think of the "incompleteness operator" as a logical operator. So the next bit of my comment may be too far afield to be helpful; if so, my apologies.)

The scope of the incompleteness operator could be more narrowly interpreted as "x knows how sorta to fix the car" or more broadly interpreted as "it is sorta the case that x knows how to fix the car." On the first interpretation the operator ranges over the adverbial clause. It sounds unusual, but I think its sound doesn't make it incorrect. If the broader interpretation is endorsed, then it seems like the inference obtains. The operator ranges over the whole proposition itself. Is there a third interpretation I'm missing?

(2) Here's a case that may be helpful for your incompleteness reading. As I understand it you're looking to block the entailment from "kinda knowing how to x" to "knowing how to x." Massachusetts still has full-service gas stations, and some folks, particularly those people who were born and raised in MA, prefer to go to these filling stations. They sorta know how to fill their gas tank (there's a medium of exchange, they have to remove the gas cap, the pump has to be inserted into the gas receptacle, the pump has to be turned on, etc.), but they don't know how to fill their gas tank.

This seems especially hard to grasp if you've pumped your own gas; it is simple to do. Nevertheless, these people really don't know how to fill their gas tank, even though they may sorta know what's involved in filling the gas tank.

[Marc Moffett]

John C. (a.k.a. Fletch),

Thanks for the comment. I do think that there is a subtle difference in meaning between the two occurences, but I am not convinced that a scope ambiguity captures it. (If it does, great!) Stated generically, I think the question of the entailment can be reduced to the following, does "kinda" mean something like "somewhat" or does it means something like "somewhat, but not more".

But this suggests a way of explicitly side-stepping the issue, which I see as tangential to the main point of the argument. Just add a clause which explicitly rules out the possibility of completeness. Thus:

(1*) x kind of knows how to fix the car, but not really.

And once again, it seems to me that the truth conditions for (1*) will be different from those involving the corresponding ability:

(2*) x is kinda of able to fix the car, but not really.

For it seems to me that the truth of (2*) requires that x be able to come close to fixing the car if she tries while the truth of (1*) does not.