Saul Kripke famously argued that some propositions are both contingent and knowable a priori. For instance, one who introduces the term ‘one meter’ as a rigid designator for the length of a certain stick s at time t is meant to be in a position to know a priori that if s exists at t then the length of s at t is one meter. Call this the meter proposition. Scott Soames (2003) says that neither the meter proposition nor any of Kripke’s other examples are genuine examples of a priori contingencies. Soames observes that the baptizer’s knowledge of the meter proposition would have to be based partly on the knowledge that the term ‘one meter’ refers in his language to the length of an object iff the length of that object is one meter. Call this further proposition the R-proposition. The question of whether the meter proposition is known a priori therefore turns on the question of whether the R-proposition is known a priori. Soames offers the following reason for denying that the R-proposition and related propositions can be known a priori: “If they could be so known, then non-English speakers should be able to know them simply by reflecting on and reasoning about them—which of course they cannot.” (2003,408-9)
Soames does, however, admit that there are genuine a priori contingencies, for instance, that if actually Princeton has a philosophy department then Princeton has a philosophy department. Call this the Princeton proposition. The argument for the contingency of the Princeton proposition is straightforward: Its antecedent will be true at all worlds—since it is true at all worlds that in our world Princeton has a philosophy department—including those worlds in which Princeton has no philosophy department. At such worlds, the conditional as a whole is false; hence, the Princeton proposition is contingent. The argument for its a priority is equally straightforward, for one can know a priori, of any proposition that one entertains, that it is true iff true in one’s own world.
I’m going to argue that Soames’s stated reason for denying that the R-proposition can be known a priori should be rejected on the grounds that it’s equally a reason for denying that the Princeton proposition can be known a priori. So Soames’s argument against the a priority of the meter proposition fails. And this isn’t merely an ad hominem attack, for it is widely assumed that such propositions as the R-proposition cannot be known a priori, yet it is difficult to find (or imagine) any reason for assuming this other than the one Soames supplies. So unless there is some flaw in the reasoning behind the a priority of the Princeton proposition (and there isn’t), we are left with no satisfactory reason for supposing these semantic facts to be knowable only a posteriori.
Soames seems to have in mind something like the following argument in the passage quoted above (I’ve added some charitable bells and whistles):
(P1) A proposition p can be known a priori only if, necessarily, if p is true then anyone who understands p and is suitably intelligent can come to know p simply by reflecting on and reasoning about it.
(P2) The R-proposition is true and some suitably intelligent individuals understand it but cannot know it simply by reflecting on and reasoning about it.
(C) So the R-proposition cannot be known a priori.
The reasoning behind P2 is straightforward: just as non-French speakers can understand the proposition that the term ‘un pouce’ refers in French to the length of an object iff the length of that object is one meter without being in any position to know whether it is true or false, non-English speakers can understand the R-proposition perfectly well without being in any position to know whether it is true or false.
But P1, together with the following premise P2*, entails that the Princeton proposition cannot be known a priori:
(P2*) Possibly, the Princeton proposition is true and some individuals understand it and are suitably intelligent but cannot know it simply by reflecting on and reasoning about it.
The possible individuals in question will be inhabitants of a world other than our own in which Princeton has a philosophy department. In order for them to understand the Princeton proposition—which is, at least in part, a proposition about our world—they have to be able to think about our world. Singling out a specific nonactual world in thought is no small feat, but we may suppose that their mental capacities far exceed our own and that they are able to get our world uniquely in mind by imagining it in full detail. They nevertheless will not be in a position to know the Princeton proposition simply by reflecting on and reasoning about it. For although they can know that its antecedent (which is true in their world iff Princeton has a philosophy department in our world) is true simply by reflecting on and reasoning about it, they cannot know that its consequent (which is true in their world iff Princeton has a philosophy department in their world) is true simply by reflecting on and reasoning about it. Consequently, they cannot know whether the conditional itself is true simply by reflecting on and reasoning about it.
So P2* is true. So either P1 is true, in which case it follows that the Princeton proposition cannot be known a priori, or P1 is false. The Princeton proposition can be known a priori. So P1 is false, Soames’s argument that the meter proposition cannot be known a priori fails, and we lose the standard (and perhaps only) reason for taking R-propositions to be knowable only a posteriori.
Great post! I think what this shows is that Soames' conception of a priori knowledge, that you spell out in (P1), is too strong because it is modeled after our knowledge of necessities, and thus already implicitly 'biased' against the contingent a priori. So, I take this to be another consideration in favor of a more minimal conception of the a priori, like the following by Casullo (Oxford Handbook of Epistemology 2002, 104):
(P2) S's belief that p is justified a priori if and only if S's belief that p is justified by some nonexperiential source.
And what we learn from your post is that semantic stipulation plausibly is a nonexperiential source of justification that is different from and goes beyond mere understanding of and reflection on a proposition...
Posted by: Joachim Horvath | July 10, 2008 at 02:44 AM
Great post. I don't see how Soames can hold on to *some* of the contingent a priori while jettisoning Kripke's original cases. I think you could also get (P2*) by supposing that someone introduces the term 'Schminston' as a proper name for Princeton. On Soames's view, (P) expresses the Princeton proposition:
(P) If actually Princeton has a philosophy department, then Schminston has a philosophy department.
But you could understand (P) w/o thereby being in a position to know the proposition it expresses just by reflection and reasoning.
A key question here is what it is to "understand" a Russellian proposition -- do you understand it by understanding any sentence that expresses it? If so -- and that seems more plausible than any alternative to me -- then it's going to be tough to come up with a strong link between a priority and understanding that gets the cases intuitively right.
Posted by: Geoff | July 10, 2008 at 09:02 AM
Sounds like I’m preaching to the choir! So let me say a couple of things in defense of Soames.
In reply to Joachim: I suspect that Soames would agree wholeheartedly to this minimal conception of the a priori. P1 isn’t meant to serve a conception or characterization of the a priori, but rather a constraint on the a priori. I take it that what Soames has in mind is that if it’s possible to get the knowledge from a nonexperiential source, that source must be available to *every* (suitably intelligent) cognizer. So (roughly) the privacy of a certain piece of knowledge is decisive evidence of is a posteriority.
In reply to Geoff: You’re certainly right that Soames has to say that the proposition expressed by (P) can be known a priori since, after all, it’s just the Princeton proposition by his lights. Yet someone can stare at (P) all day long and not realize that it’s true. Soames’s explanation might run something like this: there are different ways of entertaining a single proposition, and one has to entertain it in the right way in order to see its truth by reasoning and reflection alone. But don’t we have a counterexample to P1 so long as there’s *someone* who entertains the Princeton proposition in the way specified by (P) and therefore isn’t in a position to know it by reasoning and reflection alone? Soames will say the counterexample is spurious: anyone sophisticated enough to entertain it in way (P) will also be in a position to entertain it in the following simpler way: ‘If Princeton actually has a philosophy department then Princeton has a philosophy department.’ So they are in a position to know it by reasoning and reflection after all!
Posted by: Dan Korman | July 11, 2008 at 07:38 AM
Dan, maybe you're right and (P1) is merely intended as an additional constraint on the a priori. Still, I don't see at all why we should accept such an additional constraint, especially if it only serves to make the job easier for someone who argues against (some form of) a priori knowledge. You offer the following as a rationale for the constraint: "if it’s possible to get the knowledge from a nonexperiential source, that source must be available to *every* (suitably intelligent) cognizer." However, once it is agreed that there can be different non-experiential sources, just like there are different experiential sources, then the constraint that *every* cognizer must have all of these possible sources at his disposal seems as unmotivated as the claim that every cognizer has to have access to all empirical sources. So, do you think there is any non-ad-hoc reason to accept (P1) as an additional constraint on the a priori?
Posted by: Joachim Horvath | July 11, 2008 at 08:03 AM
Joachim, I agree completely. It's a delicate matter whether a stipulative performance can serve as a non-experiential source of justification for the stipulator (since empirical introspective knowledge may play a corrupting role). But I don't see why the *privacy* of this source is any reason to doubt that it's a non-experiential source.
Posted by: Dan Korman | July 12, 2008 at 03:08 PM
The Meter Proposition: If stick s exists at time t then the length of s at t is one meter.
The R Proposition: The term ‘one meter’ refers in my language to the length of an object iff the length of that object is one meter.
The Princeton Proposition: If actually Princeton has a philosophy department then Princeton has a philosophy department.
Soames claims that the baptizer’s knowledge of the Meter Proposition has to be based partly on the R Proposition, and that the R Proposition cannot be known a priori. He concludes that the Meter Proposition cannot be known a priori. [The R Proposition, expressed, say, in French, makes a claim about the English phrase ‘one meter.’ ]
[Soames claims that the Princeton Proposition is a contingent proposition that can be known to be true apriori.]
Dan says that we should reject Soames’ stated reason for holding that that the R- proposition can’t be known a priori.
Presumably we should reject Soames’ reason, because it would equally be a reason for denying that the Princeton proposition can be known a priori.
Since I dislike the idea that there are contingent apriori propositions, I would prefer to conclude that neither the Princeton Proposition nor the Meter Proposition can be known a priori.
Dan’s argument for the claim that the Princeton Proposition can be known to be true apriori is very brief: “one can know a proiri, of any proposition that one entertains that it is true iff in true in one’s own world.” Perhaps the ‘one’s own world’ bit here is a bit of a cheat. What we want is: For any proposition, P, P iff actually P.] It is very easy to loose track of the presumed fact that we are supposed to be dealing with a contingent proposition. How can a proposition having this form be contingent? It is contingent only when ‘P’ and ‘actually P’ are assessed in regard to different possible worlds. We have to remain open to the possibility that “Princeton has a philosophy department” is being assessed in regard to world W1 while “Actually Princeton has a philosophy department” is a claim about some other world, W2.
Do we know, a priori, that ‘The Princeton Proposition’ is NOT jumping from one possible world to another? I don’t think so. If it may be jumping in this way, then it may be false.
Hugh Chandler
Posted by: Hugh Chandler | July 25, 2008 at 12:18 PM
A somewhat irrelevant side-note
The only reason I have for disliking the contingent aprori is my assumption that if there were such a thing then the metaphysically possible worlds would not be a proper sub-set of the epistemically possible worlds. That is to say, the possible world set-up would be messy.
To add to my confusion about these matters, in his paper ‘Actually’ (Jan. 2007) Soames says, or seems to say, he believes that metaphysically possible world-states are always epistemically possible. [p. 24].
If this is compatible with his claim that some contingent propositions can be known to be true apriori, then I have no reason to dislike such propositions.
Am I wrong in thinking that a state of affairs is epistemically possible (in the relevant sense) iff it cannot be known a priori to be false? If there are contingent propositions that can be known to be true apriori, then there are contingent propositions that can be known apriori to be false. That is to say, there are contingent states of affairs that are not epistemically possible. Ug.
I hope this line of thought is screwed up in some way.
Hugh
Posted by: Hugh Chandler | July 25, 2008 at 02:34 PM
Hi Hugh,
You’re certainly right that the fact that P1 calls into question the a priority of the Princeton proposition can be viewed as a reason to deny that the Princeton proposition is a priori, rather than as a reason to reject P1.
You’re also right that my defense of the a priority of the Princeton proposition was super-condensed (see Soames 2003: 419-20 for the full story). I’m not sure I understand your worry about jumping from one possible world to another, though. If we just want to know whether a sentence is true (vs. possibly true, necessarily true), we see whether it’s true when evaluated with respect to the time and world of utterance. We know that ‘Princeton has a philosophy department’ is true so long as Princeton has a philosophy department now in our world. And we know that ‘Actually Princeton has a philosophy department’ is true so long as Actually Princeton has a philosophy department now in our world, i.e., so long as in our world Princeton has a philosophy department now in our world, i.e., so long as Princeton has a philosophy department now in our world. So they’re both true iff Princeton has a philosophy department now in our world. So they’ve got to have the same truth value. And, either way, the biconditional is true. We don’t even have to think about other worlds in evaluating the truth of this sentence, so it’s unclear where worries about “world jumping” would come in.
As for how Soames can claim that all metaphysically possible worlds are epistemically possible, while accepting that it’s metaphysically but not epistemically possible that the Princeton proposition is false: I haven’t thought this through, but I think the following line from ‘Actually’ sheds some light on how he’s thinking of things: “the propositions in terms of which [[world-states are]] defined don’t contain explicit information about other world-states.” (p.259).
Posted by: Dan Korman | July 25, 2008 at 06:10 PM
The Princeton Sentence: “If actually Princeton has a philosophy department then Princeton has a philosophy department.”
Let me try it this way: When “actually Princeton has a philosophy department” is a claim about @, and “Princeton has a philosophy department” is a claim about some OTHER world, then the Princeton Sentence expresses a contingent proposition, P1, which, I claim, can only be known to be true a posteriori. But when “actually Princeton has a philosophy department” is a claim about @ and “Princeton has a philosophy department” is also a claim about @. The Princeton Sentence expresses a necessary truth, P2, that can be known to be true apriori.
My suggestion (as of today) is that these are two different propositions. We are not talking about a single proposition which is both contingent and known to be true apriori. We are, of course, talking about one SENTENCE.
[By the way, I now agree with you in regard to the relation between the Princeton problem and the issue about metaphysical possible worlds and epistemically possible worlds. The Princeton problem has to do with a conditional proposition presumably expressing a relation between two states of affairs (or the same state of affairs designated in different ways).
Because of this, it may be the case that there are contingent apriori propositions, even though the metaphysically possible worlds are a proper sub-set of the epistemically possible worlds. Right?]
Posted by: Hugh Chandler | July 27, 2008 at 01:47 PM
The Princeton Sentence: “If actually Princeton has a philosophy department then Princeton has a philosophy department.”
Let me try it this way: When “actually Princeton has a philosophy department” is a claim about @, and “Princeton has a philosophy department” is a claim about some OTHER world, then the Princeton Sentence expresses a contingent proposition, P1, which, I claim, can only be known to be true a posteriori. But when “actually Princeton has a philosophy department” is a claim about @ and “Princeton has a philosophy department” is also a claim about @. The Princeton Sentence expresses a necessary truth, P2, that can be known to be true apriori.
My suggestion (as of today) is that these are two different propositions. We are not talking about a single proposition which is both contingent and known to be true apriori. We are, of course, talking about one SENTENCE.
[By the way, I now agree with you in regard to the relation between the Princeton problem and the issue about metaphysical possible worlds and epistemically possible worlds. The Princeton problem has to do with a conditional proposition presumably expressing a relation between two states of affairs (or the same state of affairs designated in different ways).
Because of this, it may be the case that there are contingent apriori propositions, even though the metaphysically possible worlds are a proper sub-set of the epistemically possible worlds. Right?]
Posted by: Hugh Chandler | July 27, 2008 at 01:49 PM
Hi Hugh,
It may be helpful to distinguish between (1) a speaker using a sentence to make a claim about world w, and (2) a sentence expressing a proposition that is about world w. I agree that 'Princeton has a philosophy dept' can sometimes be about the actual world and other times be about some other world, in the *first* sense. But I deny that 'Princeton has a philosophy department' is ever about any world in the second sense. It just expresses the proposition that Princeton has a philosophy dept, and this proposition is not about any world in particular. Indeed, if 'Princeton has a philosophy department' expressed a proposition about our world in this *second* sense, namely, the proposition that Princeton has a philosophy department in our world, then it would express a necessary truth. But it doesn't. So it's not about our world (or, by parity, any other world) in the second sense. It expresses a contingent proposition, one that could have been false, irrespective of what it's about in the first sense (i.e., irrespective of which world the speaker is talking about when he utters the sentence).
So the consequent of the Princeton sentence expresses a contingent proposition (again, irrespective of which world is under discussion). The antecedent expresses a necessary truth. So the antecedent-proposition is true at all worlds. Since the consequent-proposition is contingent, it must be false in some of those worlds. So the proposition expressed by the Princeton sentence has a true antecedent and a false consequent in some worlds. So it's false in some worlds. And it's true in others. So it's contingent.
Posted by: Dan Korman | July 27, 2008 at 07:14 PM
Dan,
I'm late to this discussion and have no well thought out view, but I'm worried about this:
"The possible individuals in question will be inhabitants of a world other than our own in which Princeton has a philosophy department. In order for them to understand the Princeton proposition—which is, at least in part, a proposition about our world—they have to be able to think about our world. Singling out a specific nonactual world in thought is no small feat, but we may suppose that their mental capacities far exceed our own and that they are able to get our world uniquely in mind by imagining it in full detail."
Isn't thinking about a particular world like ours by thinking about a world with all of our world's de dicto (I'm not sure that's the term I want, but I hope it gets the idea across) descriptive features not yet equivalent to thinking about our world? Given that our world is actual, we are in a position to describe the hypothetical world in such a way as to stipulate that it is our world. But could we stipulate the analogous fact regarding some non-actual world given that we don't have a directly referential way to pick it out?
Think about the analogy with what Kripke says about Richard Nixon. We can stipulate a world in which some person is Richard Nixon because we are in a position to refer to him directly. But someone not in that position can't as it were import Richard Nixon into a world by describing someone with all of his descriptive features. Shouldn't the same be true for Princeton, in which case those people in worlds where there is not such University can't have thoughts about worlds in which Princeton (as opposed to a world with a duplicate with the same name) exists?
Posted by: Mark van Roojen | August 02, 2008 at 12:03 PM
Hi Mark,
Good point. I agree that beings in a world without Nixon probably won't be able to get our world uniquely in mind. But P2* will we true so long as there's *some* world where people can do this, so let me be more cautious in picking out that world. Consider a world that contains all of the individuals that exist in our world, plus one of these super-beings (with the ability to imagine a world in full detail). The super-being is billions of years old and has had de re acquaintance with every item in his world, including Princeton and Princeton's philosophy department -- though he never bothered to check whether that philosophy department was Princeton's philosophy department. This sort of being should be able to get our world in mind by building it up from Russellian propositions about the individuals in our world (a.k.a., the individuals in his world).
Posted by: Dan Korman | August 03, 2008 at 11:09 AM
Hey Dan,
First, how's it going?
Second, I think I'll have to agree with Mark on this one. I don't think this rationale will work:
But P2* will we true so long as there's *some* world where people can do this, so let me be more cautious in picking out that world. Consider a world that contains all of the individuals that exist in our world, plus one of these super-beings (with the ability to imagine a world in full detail). The super-being is billions of years old and has had de re acquaintance with every item in his world, including Princeton and Princeton's philosophy department -- though he never bothered to check whether that philosophy department was Princeton's philosophy department. This sort of being should be able to get our world in mind by building it up from Russellian propositions about the individuals in our world (a.k.a., the individuals in his world).
I think it won't work for reasons connected to Chisholm's paradox. If we give the subject all the knowledge you describe and that knowledge doesn't entail that the relevant proposition is true, we should be able to run the argument that there's nothing that the being could use to fix reference that would discriminate worlds in which that proposition is true from very similar worlds in which it's false. It seems to block this, you'd have to say that there was something accessible to this subject to fix reference uniquely, and I suspect that this requires assuming that sufficient conditions for the existence of a particular's existence can be specified in ways that don't assume prior knowledge of de re propositons concerning the relevant individual. If you reject sufficiency of origins accounts, I don't see how P2* could turn out true.
Posted by: Clayton Littlejohn | August 09, 2008 at 06:14 PM
Hi Dan,
In your response to an earlier comment posted by Hugh, you say: "So the consequent of the Princeton sentence expresses a contingent proposition (again, irrespective of which world is under discussion). The antecedent expresses a necessary truth. So the antecedent-proposition is true at all worlds."
I'm having difficulty with the idea that the antecedent of the Princeton Proposition ("actually Princeton has a philosophy department") is a necessary truth. If I understand correctly, you (and Soames) might explain this as: (1) "actually Princeton has a philosophy department" means something like "in our actual world (call it w1) Princeton has a philosophy department", (2) "Princeton has a philosophy department in w1" is true from the perspective of every other world, and so (C) "actually Princeton has a philosophy department" is necessarily true.
But then, wouldn't the consequent "Princeton has a philosophy department" also mean something like "in our actual world (call it w1) Princeton has a philosophy department"? Then since "Princeton has a philosophy department in w1" is true from the perspective of every other world, by the same reasoning "Princeton has a philosophy department" would be necessarily true.
And I think we can all agree that the consequent is *not* necessary (for then *every* proposition would be necessary), so it seems that either (1) I haven't laid out the proper reasoning for the necessity of the antecedent, in which case a different, successful line of reasoning exists that *cannot be applied to the consequent* (and below I give my reasons for thinking this to be doubtful) or , or (2) there is no difficulty with the reasoning I've described for the necessity of the antecedent, but it cannot be applied to the consequent for some reason, or (3) (my current position) neither the antecedent nor the consequent are necessary. (And I won't describe my thoughts on exactly how the reasoning I've described is flawed, because quite possibly I've missed something much earlier along the way.)
What have I missed?
Probably I fail to see that the consequent should be handled any differently from the antecedent because I don't think that adding the word 'actually' in front of a proposition makes any change to its truth conditions. But I don’t see why it would be otherwise. What is the difference between "actually the soup contains carrots", "it is true that the soup contains carrots", "the soup contains carrots", or even "actually it is true that it is the case that the soup contains carrots"? (Blackburn makes this point in _Truth: A Guide_ 2007.)
So to me it looks like the Princeton Proposition is just necessary a priori (If P, then P), and that there is no reason to treat the antecedent differently from the consequent.
I look forward to your response!
Posted by: laro | August 10, 2008 at 12:36 AM
Clayton --
All’s well, thanks! I’m about to head off to Austin for their methodology workshop (I’m giving a talk on paraphrase strategies). Maybe you can drop in?
I’m not sure I understand your worry about P2*. Our being looks right at Princeton and entertains the proposition that *it* has a philosophy department. As it happens, the proposition is true; but he has no way of knowing it. Now he starts filling in the details of the world he wants to think about (he’ll call it ‘world w’), and one such detail is that it (i.e., Princeton) has a philosophy dept in that world. So there’s no threat of ‘world w’ picking out a world (no matter how similar) in which the proposition that Princeton has a philosophy dept is false; it’s built right into his description that it (Princeton) does have a philosophy dept. So his knowledge does entail that it’s true in w that Princeton has a philosophy dept. But of course his knowledge doesn’t entail that (in his own world) Princeton has a philosophy dept -- which is what’s needed to secure P2*. I’m not sure why any detour into necessity of origins (or descriptive info about a thing's origins) would be necessary. Does this help, or am I missing your worry?
Pamela --
I don’t mean to be (and Soames doesn’t need to be) making any claims about the ordinary English word ‘actually’. Blackburn’s probably right that, in its ordinary use, affixing it to a sentence doesn’t change its truth conditions. I’m using it in what may just be a technical sense, to mean ‘in the actual world’.
So I’m not sure you’ve missed anything. My view (and Soames’s) is that adding ‘actually’ (in the intended sense) does change the truth conditions. Let W be some world in which Hillary won the nomination. The proposition that Hillary won and the proposition that in W Hillary won are two different propositions with two different truth conditions (and two different truth values). In fact, the latter is necessarily true. It’s true in the actual world that in W Hillary won; it’s true in W that in W Hillary won; it’s true no matter which world you evaluate that proposition at. Similarly for the proposition that actually Princeton has a philosophy dept. i.e., the proposition that in W* Princeton has a philosophy dept (where, as it happens, W* is our world).
Posted by: Dan Korman | August 10, 2008 at 03:58 PM
Thanks, Dan.
Right – obviously ‘actually’ is a technical term. (Sorry to miss that earlier.) I now see that the antecedent of the proposition ‘actually P implies P’ is necessary. And the consequent is contingent, so the whole thing is contingent.
And if ‘actually P’ means something like ‘it is true of the actual world that P’, then, provided that the actual world can be rigidly designated, the proposition ‘actually P implies P’ is knowable a priori _in the actual world_. (It cannot be knowable a priori in possible worlds for this would involve considering those possible worlds as actual, or it would not. If we are allowed to consider possible worlds as actual (meaning that the actual world wouldn’t be rigidly designated) then the term ‘actually’ would add nothing, for ‘actually P’ would mean ‘it is true of the actual world that P’, but the ‘actual world’ would change depending on which possible world we were evaluating the claim ‘actually P’ from, and we’d be evaluating a different proposition: ‘P implies P’. If we don’t consider possible worlds as actual, then ‘actually P’ has no relation to whether P is true in that possible world or not, so the proposition is not knowable a priori.)
However, I’m not sure if this is right, but it seems that if the condition ‘in the actual world’ must be added in order for the proposition to be knowable a priori, then it also affects the contingency of the proposition as well. That is, if ‘actually P implies P’ is in the actual world knowable a priori, it is also, in the actual world, necessary, not contingent.
Posted by: laro | September 01, 2008 at 12:41 AM
My hand out for my Metaphysics class:
The Princeton proposition: If actually Princeton has a philosophy department then Princeton has a philosophy department.
Proof that the Princeton proposition is contingent:
(1) Princeton does, in fact, have a philosophy department, and our world is the actual world. Thus “Actually Princeton has a philosophy department” is true. In fact, it is necessarily true.
(2) On the other hand “Princeton has a philosophy department” is a contingent truth. There are lots of possible worlds in which Princeton does not have a philosophy department.
(3) Thus the Princeton proposition is an ‘if P then Q’ proposition with a necessary truth as the front part and a contingent proposition as its back part. Such a proposition is true when its back part is true, and false when its back part is false. So the Princeton proposition is contingent.
Is it possible for the Princeton proposition to be true, but not knowable a priori by some possible intelligent, etc. people through reasoning?
Korman tries to imagine some such people. His imaginary people inhabit a possible, but non-actual world, and supposedly they somehow know that their world is non-actual. What?? This doesn’t make any sense.
If they think about this problem at all, and are not stupid, or crazy, they are going to take "’the actual world’ to designate the world they inhabit.
Posted by: Hugh Chandler | September 19, 2010 at 12:06 PM
what are you talking about? Nixon? are you insane? if I can turn back in time and kick her mother provoked a abort, this world probably would be a better place if his existense was just a tale.
Posted by: Best Online Pharmacy | December 19, 2011 at 11:05 AM